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Money-Income Relationships
and the Exchange Rate Regime
TERRY C. MILLS and GEOFFREY E. WOOD
IL HE analysis recently elaborated in the monetary
approach to the balance of payments literature
demonstrates that the ability of a particular mone-
tary authority to control its domestic monetary con-
ditions depends crucially on two factors. The first
relates to whether or not the country is the reserve
currency center (the country whose money is held
as international reserves by other countries); the
second concerns the prevailing exchange rate regime.
As that body of analysis shows, the monetary au-
thorities in non-reserve centers can fully control
domestic monetary conditions only under a com-
pletely freely floating exchange rate regime. With
pegged exchange rates, the authority’s control over
monetary conditions is limited by the extent to which
they are willing to allow their exchange rate to
change or their willingness to change their stock of
international reserves. Otherwise, they can neither
offset a monetary impulse from abroad nor affect
nominal income by their own monetary actions.
The monetary approach to balance-of-payments
analysis also indicates that, in contrast to the situa-
tion in non-reserve centers, the monetary authorities
in the reserve center can influence monetary condi-
tions both domestically and in non-reserve centers
(by influencing worldwide monetary conditions) un-
der a fixed exchange rate regime. Of course, they
can influence only their own monetary conditions
when exchange rates are floated.’
NOTE: Terry C. Mills is a lecturer in econometrics at the
University of Leeds, England. This paper was in large part
written while Geoffrey E. Wood, Senior Lecturer in Banking
and International Finance at the City University, London,
England, was visiting the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
rThe monetary approach to balance-of-payments analysis has
a long history, dating certainly from David Hume’s essay
“Of the Balance of Trade,” first published in 1752, which
can be found in David Hume: Writings on Economics, ed.
Eugene Rotwein (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wiscon-
sin Press, 1970), pp. 60-77. The modem reintegration of
monetary and balance-of-payments ai3alysis was pioneered in
James Edward Meade, The Balance of Payments (London:
Oxford University Press, 1951), and a sample of recent work
is contained in Jacob A. Freakel and 1-lany C. Johnson, eds.,
The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments (Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975).
The importance of utilizing this approach to assess
the relationship between money and income is high-
lighted by the apparently contrasting results obtained
in recent studies of the money-income relationship
for the United States and the United Kingdom. These
studies used the Sims test, which is designed to deter-
mine the existence and direction of causality between
two variables.2 That test is based upon the assump-
tion that if one variable leads another (temporally),
it can cause movements in that other variable, while
if one variable follows the other, no such possibility
exists.3
In terms of a money stock variable (M) and an
income variable (Y), if changes in M cause changes
in Y, then a regression of current Mo npast, present,
and future values of Y should show significant coeffi-
cients for future, and perhaps present, values of Y,
but insignificant coefficients on past values of Y. Fur-
ther, if changes in M cause changes irs Y, regressing Y
on past, present, and future values of M should yield
significant coefficients on past, and perhaps present,
values of M, and insignificant coefficients on future
values of M.
Sims applied this test to the United States and
found that changes in monetary growth caused
changes in the growth rate of income.4 However,
2Christopher A. Sims, “Money, Income, and Causality,” Amer-
ican Economic Review (September 1972), pp. 540-52.
3
C. W. J. Cranger and Paul Newbold, Forecasting Economic
Time Series (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 225,
suggest that in discussing tests of the types set out here, it
may be preferable to replace the word “cause” with the
phrase “temporally related,” as these tests do not necessarily
satisfy the nonnal philosophical criteria for establishing caus-
ality. But as H. Feigl states in, “Notes on Causality” in H.
Feigl and M. Broadbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of
Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953),
p. 408, “The clarified (purified) concept of causality is de-
fined in terms of predictability according to a law (or more
adequately, according to a set of laws ) .“ This suggests that
the word “cause” may be permissible in the present context
in view of the existence of a predictive model which under-
lies the analysis. An extensive discussion of these issues can
be found in Arnold Zellner, “Causality and Econometrics”
(Paper presented at University of Rochester-Camegie Mellon
University Conference, University of Rochester, April 1978).
~Sims,“Money, Income, and Causality.”
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when Williams, Coodhart. and Gowland applied this
test to data from the U.K. economy for the 1/1958
111/1971 period, they found no clear evidence of
causality in either direction.5 This result conflicts not
only with Sims’ results for the United States, but also
with other findings, which demonstrate a well deter-
mined money-income relationship for the United
Kingdom, derived by estimating money demand
equations.°
The results can, however, be reconciled by recog-
nizing the significance of the exchange rate regime
for the influence of money on income.
Aitir-nativ~~
The failure of Williams, Coodhart, and Gowland to
find a one-way relationship between money and in-
come by means of the Sims test can bear more than
one interpretation. It can mean that no causal rela-
tionship exists. Alternately, it can mean that the
money-income causal relationship varied within their
data period. On some occasions, when the monetary
fluctuation either originated from the reserve center,
was in line with a monetary fluctuation in the reserve
center, or was accommodated by an exchange rate
change, money influenced income in the United King-
dom. At other times, the monetary stimulus, of do-
mestic origin, led to balance-of-payments pressure
which induced the monetary authorities to reverse
5David Williams, C. A. E. Goodhart, and D. H. Gowland,
“Money, Income, and Causality: the U.K. Experience,”
American Economic Review (June 1976), pp. 417-23.
OWe
11
determined money demand functions for the United
Kingdom have been found by, among others, L. D. D. Price,
“The Demand for Money in the United Kingdom: A Further
Investigation,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (March
1972), pp. 43-55, and Michael J. Flamburger, “The Demand
for Money in an Open Economy: Germany and the United
Kingdom,” Journal of Monetary Economics (January 1977),
pp. 25-40. In his paper, “The Demand for Money in the
United Kingdom: Experience Since 1971,” Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin (September 1974), pp. 284-305, Crahans
Hacche found that the fit of previously estimated Ml demand
equations for the United Kingdom appeared to deteriorate
towards the end of 1971. This might perhaps suggest that
the money-income relationship is not particularly stable in
the United Kingdom. However, a more recent study, R. T.
Coghlan, “A Transactions Demand for Money, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin (March 1976), p. 51, found that
the evidence would now appear to support the exis-
tence of a stable demand-for-money function It is sug-
gested in Michael J. Hamburger and Geoffrey E. Wood,
“Interest Rates and Monetary Policy in Open Economies”
(Paper presented at the Allied Social Science Association’s
Annual Meeting, New York, December 26-30, 1977), that the
deterioration in fit which Hacche found may have been due
to a policy-induced change in the stmcture of financial
markets.
their previous monetary policy with sufficient rapid-
ity that the initial monetary stimulus did not persist
long enough to have a discernible effect on income.
If this occurred, no causality from money to income
would be observed. Further, when the U.K. mone-
tary authorities were pegging the exchange rate and
resisting interest rate movements — as they were for a
substantial part of the data period used by Williams,
Coodhart, and Gowland — an exogenous income fluc-
tuation would induce an accommodating monetary
response.7
In other words, within their data period, on some
occasions money influenced income; on some occa-
sions income influenced money; and on other occa-
sions monetary actions were so quickly reversed that
there was no time for them to influence income. The
Williams, Goodhart, and Gowland result could there-
fore have been produced by their carrying out their
test over what was a collection of subperiods, heter-
ogeneous with respect to the causal relationship be-
tween money and income, as if the collection was
actually one homogeneous data set. (It should be em-
phasized that the nature of the test, in combination
with U.K. exchange rate policy, gave them no alter-
native in the data set they used.8)
7
An analysis of how, in these conditions, monetary policy can
only accommodate income fluctuations can be found in Rob-
ert A. Mundell, “The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal
Policy for Internal and External Stability,” International
Monetary Fund Staff Papers (March 1962), pp. 70-79. A
description by the U.K. monetary authorities themselves of
their attitude towards interest rates can be found in “Key
Issues in Monetary and Credit Policy~”a speech by L. K.
(now Lord) O’Brien, then Governor of the Bank of England,
given at an intemational banking conference at Munich on
May 28, 1971, and printed in the Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin (June 1971), pp. 195-98. Williams et al. do not say
explicitly that they consider exchange rate policy and interest
rate policy to have produced their results. Their article does,
however, contain a summary of the conduct of U.K. monetary
policy similar to that given above, and concludes with a sen-
tence which can readily bear the interpretation that they
believe that, as a consequence of seeking other objectives, the
authorities lost control over U.K. monetary conditions. “This
suggests, perhaps, a more complicated causal relationship
between money and incomes in which both are determined
simultaneously.”
It is conceivable in principle that the results of Williams et
al. were produced because the adjustment of income to money
was complete within the unit of observation. But that does not
seem a reasonable explanation in the present case, as it would
imply a lag of about one-eighth of that found by other studies.
These studies are surveyed in David Laidler, “Inflation in
Britain: A Monetarist Perspective,” Amnerican Economic Re-
view (September 1976), pp. 485-500.
5
A most useful analysis of economic policy in the United
Kingdom, highlighting the relationship between the conduct
of monetary policy and the state of the balance of payments,
can be found in Dietrich K. Fausten, The Consistency of
British Balance of Payments Policies (London: Macmillan,
1975).
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Therefore, the conflict between the results of Wil-
liams, Coodhart, and Gowland and the finding of a
stable money demand function in the United King-
dom can be reconciled by the argument that the
causal relationship between money and income in
their data period should be, as indeed they found it,
not clear cut in either direction. The relationship
would vary with both the origin of the monetary
impulse (whether or not it came from abroad), and
the effect it was allowed to have on the exchange
rate or the United Kingdom’s stock of international
reserves.
Furthermore, the analysis also suggests why Sims
encountered no such interpretation problems. He ap-
plied the test to the United States, which was the
reserve center in his data period, and therefore pro-
duced results consistent with both United States
money demand studies and more general studies such
as Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz,
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-7960
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) .°
The empirical findings of Sims and of Williams,
Goodhart, and Gowland are consistent with the above
analysis of the importance of both the exchange rate
regime and how it influenced the behavior of policy-
makers in the interpretation of the money-income
relationship. They do not, however, yield very strong
support for this proposition, since the implication
from the monetary approach to balance of payments
was that when applying the Sims test, the exchange
rate regime should not affect the result for the
United States and that the test should reveal no clear
cut relationship for the United Kingdom. It is strongly
desirable that the analysis be tested on some other
data set, for which it yields a diflerent and more
clear-cut prediction.1°
°Questions have been raised about Sims’ findings, but his
findings seem to be fairly generally accepted; see, for ex-
ample, Yash P. Mehra, “An Empirical Note on Some Mone-
tarst Propositiom,” Southern Economic Journal (July 1978),
pp. 154-67. A discussion and assessment of the reasons under-
lying the questioning of Sims’ findings can be found in C.
William Schwert, “Tests of Causality: The Message in the
Innovations” (Working Paper Series No. GPB77-4, Graduate
School of Management, University of Rochester, 1977).
lOBluford H. Putnam and D. Sykes Wilford, “Money, Income,
and Causality in the United States and the United King-
dom: A Theoretical Explanation of Different Findings,”
American Economic Review (June 1978), pp. 423-27, use
a simple fonnal model, based upon the monetary approach
to balance-of-payments analysis, to develop a reconciliation
of the Sims and Williams et al. results which is similar to
that suggested above. However, their reconciliation depends
on the assumption of very rapid arbitrage of prices inter-
nationally. Without that assumption, which is inconsistent
with findings in John Williamson and Geoffrey E. Wood,
“The British Inflation, Indigenous or Imported?” American
It might appear that data from any country, ex-
cept the United States, would be suitable so long as
it was from the period of floating exchange rates
since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in
1971-72. There are, however, two difficulties with
such a choice. First, the period is rather short for the
testing of a money-income relationship by the Sims
method. Second, the float has not been free from
official exchange market intervention, so the results
of a causality test would be predicted to remain
ambiguous. Nor can any suitable data be obtained
prior to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agree-
ment, for virtually no country pursued an unvarying
exchange rate policy throughout that period.
There is, however, one set of data, although cer-
tainly not recent, which is suitable for the present
test. It consists of U.K. data for the period 1870 to
1914, the heyday of the gold standard and fixed ex-
change rates. This episode is long enough for the
testing of a money-income relationship, the exchange
rate was pegged throughout the period, and the focus
of monetary policy was the condition of the balance
of payments.n Hence, the situation corresponds ex-
actly to the fixed exchange rate model analyzed by,
for example, R. A. Mundell, in which monetary policy
cannot affect income, but rather income fluctuations
produce accommodating monetary flows.12
Accordingly, an application of the Sims causality
test to this period, if it found that income led money,
would support the proposition that the exchange rate
regime is crucial to the interpretation of the results of
a two variable test for the causal relationship between
money and income.
Economic Review [September 1976], pp. 520-31, one
must take account of the interaction of the attitudes of the
monetary authorities with the exchange rate regime, in the
manner done above, before the findings of Sims and Wil-
liams et al. can be reconciled. Further, Putnam and Wil-
ford’s paper includes no empirical work.
“Some countries had their exchange rates pegged to sterling,
so the system was not the pure gold standard of theory. The
Bank of England did, however, act by gold standard mies
and adjusted monetary policy as indicated by the U.K. bal-
ance of payments. A brief and vivid description of the con-
duct of U.K. monetary policy in this period can be found
in Norman Macrae, ‘Towards a Keynesian Friedmanism,”
The Economist, June 17-23, 1978, pp. 37-41, and a detailed
analysis is given in Alec C. Ford, The Gold Standard,
1850-1914.’ Britain and Argentina (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962).
tm2
See B. A. Mundell, “The Appropriate Use of Monetary and
Fiscal Policy.’ That would also he the prediction of Putnam
and Wilford’s niodel, “Money, Income, and Causality,” if
one relaxed their assumption of very rapid price arbitrage.
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The relationship between nominal income and
nominal money was assumed to be linear in levels of
the variables; identical results were found when the
estimation procedure was repeated with the variables
in logarithmic form.~~
The number of future and past lags included in the
regressions was determined by the form of the data.
The M series relates to year-end stock whereas the
Y series relates to a flow throughout the year. Thus
the income observation associated with year t, Y~,
must be regarded as leading the corresponding
money observation, Mm, by approximately six months.
Therefore, when regressing Mo nY, the contempora-
neous variable Y~must be regarded as a past lag,
whereas when regressing Y on M, the contempo-
rancous variable M~must be considered as a future
lag.
Incorporating that point and considering the de-
grees of freedom available led to the specification of




(Za) y~ ~ +a
21
t 1 fi~M~÷ +yaM~ + u,~.
In tenns of the coefficients of these models, uni-
directional causality from Y to M requires that


















The first set of conditions would show Y temporally
leading M and the second would show M temporally
leading Y.
ilAs nominal income from 1870 to 1914 we used CNP, and
as money for that period we used a series calculated by
Shizuya Nishiniura, The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange
in the London Money Market, 1855-1913 (London: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1971). This latter series is the clos-
est approximation to current Ml which is available for our
data period; we are indebted to Professor Nishimura for his
extensive discussion of the series with us.
The actual estimation and testing procedures are
outlined in the Appendix, while the resulting esti-
mates and test statistics, accompanied by related
summary statistics. are given in Table I. Columns
(1b) and (2b) show the results obtained by estimat-
ing the two equations under the assumption that
the errors were generated by a first order auto-
regressive process, with p denoting the estimate of
the coefficient of that process. Columns (ic) and
(2c) show the results obtained from estimating the
equations under the restrictions 3~= 0 and 32 = 0
respectively, while columns (ld) and (2d) show the
results obtained under the restrictions Ym = 0 and
= 0. The variable L denotes the log likelihood of
each estimated equation and T denotes the number
of observations. The X2 statistics derived from
these log likelihoods test the above restrictions as
follows: X?~tests the null hypothesis [3, = 0, and
X~2tests the null hypothesis y~= 0. (See Appendix
for further details.)
From the values of X~0and X~d,we cannot reject
the null hypotheses [3~= 0 and ~2 = 0 at any con-
ventional significance level, whereas from the values
of X~. and X~,the null hypotheses [32 = 0 and y1
= 0
can be rejected at the .005 and .05 levels of signifi-
cance respectively. In view of the conditions required
for the existence of unidirectional causality, these
results imply that there is unidirectional causality
between Y and M, the direction of causality being
from Y to M. In other words, fluctuations in Y induce
fluctuations in M. There is no evidence to suggest
that there is any causality running from M to Y.
Although the estimated regression coefficients show
that the lag distributions are rather loosely deter-
mined — no doubt a consequence of the lack of any
prior restrictions on their shape — one important fea-
ture emerges. The largest and most significant co-
efficients appear on the contemporaneous indepen-
dent variables in all regressions, on the one period
past lag variable in the Mo nY regressions and on
the one period future lag variable in the Y on M
regressions. In view of the data considerations dis-
cussed previously, this suggests that income led
money by 6 to 18 months.
It has been argued that, when interpreting the
results of the Sims test for causality, it is essential to
consider the expected effects of exchange rate policy
if the test is being used to examine the relationship
between money and income. The results of both the
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APPENDIX
The basic equations to he estimated are
(In) M1=a10+a~t+!$11Y1÷1 *~yi~Y1~+u,,
(Zn) V, = 020 + a
2
t +I1~21M1, +~Yg~M1_~ + un
t=1.2,..., T.
However, as the precise use of significance tests on
groups of coefficients is required, it is important that
the errors in the regressions be serially uneorrelated.
Although the md us ion of a linear time trend in the
equations will partially account for serial correlation,
the error terms were assumed to he generated by first













with e,, and 21 assumed to he independently nnrniallv
rlistrihuted random variables with zero means and con-
stant variances. This assumption led to the use of
n3aximwu likelihood estunation methods rather than
conventional regression techniques. Equations (Ia) and



















t** ~,, I M~+e,~
where M~ = M,--p, M, M~° =M —p. M, ~, etc.
The Inaxinuim likelihood (ML) estimate of p,. i = 1 or
2, was obtained 1w minimizing
5T
1
,, (p,)i (i—p j)
where a
0
(p,) = S,,,(p,)!T, S,,(p,) being the residual sum
of squares from the regression of equation (ih), i =
or 2, associated with a given value of p1.’ This minimi-
zation was actually accomplished by searching over the
admissible range of p, , (—1, 1). ML estimates of the
other parameters of (ib) were obtained as the coefficients
of the regression associated with the ML estimate ~ib~
Under the hypotheses fi, = 0 and /3~ = 0. the following
restricted models were obtained:
See Phoehus j. Dhr roes, Distributed Logs: Problems of
Estimation, and Formulation (San Francisco: tlo]deu—Dav,
1971), pp. 64—70.





(2c) Y~°°ao(l—p,) + 02)500 ymxr +
Again, ML estimates of the parameters of these models
were obtained by ininimiziug
.2 2 LII




and estimating the coefficients if the regression asso-
ciated with pu..
The above hypotheses were tested by constructing the
appropriate likelihood ratio test. Since the maximum
log likelihood of equations (ib) and (ic), denoted L11,
and L1~,are
I [ &2(pih)
= ~ — ~in [ (1 ~ I/I
I I~ ____________ and L. = Constant — T in [(1 —~ )
respectively, then the statistic
XT~.= 2(L11, —
is asymptotically distributed as chi square with k,
degress of freedom, k, being the number of coefficients
in fl.2 Values of this statistic greater than X~ (k,)
ill reject the null hypothesis /3, = 1) at the (1 a)
level of significance.
A similar approach “as taken in testing the hy—
potheses y, = 0 and y~ = 0. 1lere the restricted





) +0)) t~ +1$~,Y~+ 11
(2d) Y~’=am(i_pm)=amjt°°t~ M~ ~
ML estimation of these models leads to the test statistic
= 2(LIh —
values of which greater than X~(h,), where h1 is the
mmher of coefficients in y , lead to the rejection of
the null hypothesis y, = 0 at the (1-—a) level of
significance.
tm
See Dhrvmes. ‘Distributed Lags,’ PP. 83-84.
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